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God, Guilt and Death: An Existential Phenomenology of Religion by Merold 
Westphal. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Pp. xiv + 305. 
ROBERT C. NEVILLE, State University of New York at Stony Brook. 
This handsome book is the outcome of several years teaching a successful course 
in phenomenology of religion, according to its author, and its virtues as a textbook 
in phenomenology or philosophy of religion are extraordinary. Although teachers' 
choices of textbooks are highly personal, Westphal's book is well worth a trial. 
It present a clearly focused scheme for organizing religious phenomena and it 
introduces students to phenomena and texts of the major world religions and 
"primitive" religions. Most helpful of all, perhaps, Westphal is able to say clearly 
and precisely what he means, and this model of sophisticated writing is of 
inestimable value for the undergraduate classroom. 
Westphal begins his book with a methodological chapter on phenomenology, 
distinguishing its descriptive goal from the goals of explanation and critical 
evaluation. In the long run I believe this distinction fails. Practically, as Gadamer 
has argued, we need to employ and control for our own prejudices if we are to 
engage the phenomena themselves, and this means that our own assumptions 
about how things work (explanations) and our values are inextricably, if critically, 
bound up with description. Theoretically, the assumption that religious 
phenomena just sit there as positive facts ready for description betrays a kind of 
philosophic positivism otherwise uncongenial to Westphal's view. Rather, things 
to be described, especially religious phenomena, are themselves achievements 
of value and so even the most objective description contains assumptions about 
what is valuable in them and why. What Westphal usually means by description 
is classification according to his scheme, and of course the scheme reflects what 
he takes to be important rather than trivial, and includes a formal organization 
that indicates something of why the important is important. That his scheme 
accurately reflects what is important in the phenomena only underscores the 
point that description includes explanation and critical evaluation internally 
instead of standing in external distinction from them. In the short run, however, 
the forceful distinction of his project from explanation and evaluation allows 
Westphal to distance his readers from their immediate prejudices and look at 
religious phenomena afresh as if they were alien and interesting. This is essential 
in an undergraduate text, and Westphal does not attempt to build upon theoretical 
claims that extend beyond his short run goal. He recommends that readers might 
want to skip the methodological chapter temporarily and move first into the 
discussion of religion. 
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As his subtitle indicates, Westphal's classificatory scheme comes from the 
existentialist tradition. With unusual sophistication he weaves a subtle discussion 
of the 20th century debates on existentialist themes into his phenomenological 
exploration. A list of the central chapter titles indicates the main themes: "Am-
bivalence and the Sacred," "Ambivalence, Inertia, and Resentment," "The Exis-
tential Meaning of Guilt," "The Existential Meaning of Death," "The Believing 
SouJ's Encounter with Guilt and Death," "Religion as Means and as End," and 
"Prayer and Sacrifice as Useless Self-Transcendence." Hegel and Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche and Freud. Otto and Ricoeur, are continuous dialogue partners 
throughout this discussion, by name often, and by position even when unnamed. 
Westphal has a sharp eye and ready answer for any who would employ reductionist 
techniques to study religion. The text clearly indicates that these are concepts 
that find illustration not just in biblical religions, the most common source of 
proof-texts, but in other religions as well. Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, African, 
Native American, and Oceanic religious phenomena are treated with the same 
seriousness that the Christian and Jewish religions of his most likely readers 
receIVe. Although the book is a-historical in neglecting the historical development 
of religions, it understands that such development does take place and merely 
seeks to find examples of its phenomenological classes at whenever stage of 
development they appear. 
The capstone chapters of the book treat guilt and death in religion by dividing 
religious sensibilities into three main classes: exilic religion, mimetic religion, 
and covenantal religion. Exilic religion takes life in the world as such to be an 
exile- from the soul's true home, with salvation being a return from exile. Mimetic 
religion takes life in the world to be normatively controlled by a right relation 
to nature, and salvation has to do with a rehearsal, often guided by myth, of the 
origins and depths of nature. Covenantal religion adds the historical dimension 
to mimetic religion, giving historical meanings to guilt and death, and to salvation. 
These categories are used to classify religious phenomena, not whole traditions. 
Thm., while Hinduism most obviously displays exilic elements, it contains 
mimetic and covenantal ones as well; Christianity is exilic and mimetic as well 
as obviously covenantal. Westphal develops this classificatory scheme with abun-
dant illustrations and much greater subtlety than I have the space to indicate 
here The unusual clarity and simplicity of this scheme make it a powerful tool 
for gaining an orientation to religious phenomena. Even if one does not like the 
scheme or believes that it is not as clear when pressed as when first stated and 
illuSlrated, its advantage in undergraduate pedagogy is plain. 
Never does Westphal claim that this is the only scheme for describing religious 
phenomena, or even that it is the best of several. So to suggest some of its 
limitations is not exactly a criticism, rather an attempt to extend the discussion 
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to issues that don't surface enough in this book. 
The volume contains only one extended discussion of Confucianism, and it 
focuses on sacrifice rather than on becoming a sage, the central Confucian salvific 
concern. The reason for this slim treatment, I suspect, is that the Confucian (and 
taoist) assumptions about the self do not allow for a serious modeling of guilt, 
or a concern for a guilty death. For Confucians, evil-doing and small-mindedness 
come from selfish desires that block or distort our natively "in tune" responses 
to things. This is distorted development, with both social and personal roots. 
But it is not the kind of ontological or existential contradiction that sin is perceived 
to be in biblical religions for which human identity is defined onto logically by 
the covenant and contradicted ontologically by breaking the covenant. From the 
standpoint of Westphal's categories, the heart of Confucianism doesn't register; 
maybe it would be taken to be more an ethical than a religious set of phenomena. 
(From a Confucian's standpoint, Westphal's categories might be accepted as 
appropriate for analyzing barbarian religions.) 
Keeping in mind the usefulness of Westphal's categories, their limitation, I 
believe, is that they lack the perspectival protection of abstraction. Taking such 
concrete phenomena as he does, guilt and death, Westphal's attempt to generalize 
them as pervasive throughout all religions has no control. What if those 
phenomena are very important in religions close to home, present but not so 
important in other religions, and virtually absent (death cannot be absent, of 
course, but it might not have much religious importance) in yet other religions? 
How would Westphal's phenomenological method allow him to tell about this? 
Won't he be inclined to ascribe them a false importance in the second group of 
religions and to deny proper religious status to the third group? What in the 
methodology would prevent this? He might say that he is not talking about 
religious traditions, only about religious phenomena which might occur in all 
religions. But this does not counter the charge that his scheme unwittingly reflects 
the biases of certain traditions to the neglect or distortion of others. The attempt 
to describe with a classificatory scheme has no built-in protection against lasting 
arbitrariness. 
By the "protection of abstraction" I mean the following. Suppose that Westphal 
were to develop a very abstract theory of the self, of being in the world, of time, 
of existence, a theory so abstract that it applies vaguely to all cultures, so far 
as we can know. Of course that theory applies differently to the different cultures, 
and one's philosophy would have to spell out what the differences are between 
a self defined covenantally, for instance, and a self defined as "one body with 
the world." The process of moving back and forth slowly between the vague 
abstractions and their diverse specific embodiments in concrete cultural 
phenomena would provide checks on the application of concrete classifications. 
It would provide reasons for the limitations of the classifications, and possibly 
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also suggestions for alternate concrete categories. Without a self-conscious, 
historically understood, practice of moving between abstractions and concrete 
phenomena, it is impossible to avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. Guilt 
is too concrete, I believe, to be generalizable as an essential characteristic of 
religion. 
To accept the protection of abstraction against bias and dogmatism may well 
be to abandon phenomenology of religion as a discipline with its own integrity. 
Westphal makes no exclusive claims for it, and his practice here is very helpful 
for its purpose. I would hope, however, that he would now tum his considerable 
talents and erudition to a more inclusive philosophy of religion. 
Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about Faith, by C. Stephen Evans. Downers 
Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1985. Pp. 191. $6.95. 
STANLEY OBITTS, Westmont College. 
This book is one of the "Contours of Christian Philosophy" series of which Prof. 
Evans is also the editor. The series describes itself as consisting of "short, 
introductory-level textbooks," a description which accurately fits this book. Yet 
the book is far from superficial, is up-to-date, is very readable, and is remarkeably 
thorough for its size. 
The thrust of the book is a Christian justification of religious belief. Right 
from the beginning the stance of the book on the relation of faith and reason is 
made clear. Fideism is rejected because it denies the common ground with the 
nonbeliever required for genuine reflection on religion. The presuppositionless 
approach of neutralism is found equally unsatisfactory for it ignores what weak 
foundationalism recognizes, namely, that reason is "a willingness to test one's 
commitments." The approach said to be taken in the book is that of a "critical 
dialog" with the nonbeliever, always open to his objections. 
Little more than an "impasse" is promised in the dialog, however. For example, 
in Malcolm's version of the ontological argument the weak premise is said to 
be the one holding that God's existence is possible (not impossible), because 
the nonbeliever supposedly would not accept it. And since the criterion of rational 
conviction is "person relative," the dialog breaks down. But is the theistic God's 
existence impossible? If not, then it must be possible, which is all Malcolm's 
argument needs. If the nonbeliever refuses to admit this, then at least he should 
be made to feel the onus of breaking off the dialog for no good reason. Perhaps 
the sllccess of an argument should not be so tightly linked with its being convincing 
to a given individual. One could be so intent on maintaining the posture of 
